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COMPETITION POLICY AND THE TECHNOLOGIES OF INFORMATION
Herbert Hovenkamp*
When we speak about information and competition policy we are
thinking mainly about oral or written communications that have an
anticompetitive potential, and mainly in the context of collusion of
exclusionary threats. These are important topics. Indeed, among the most
difficult problems that competition policy has had to deal with over the
years is understanding communications that can be construed as either
threats or as offers to collude or facilitators of collusion.1
Of course, explicit price fixing is a use of information, but so are
various kinds of cartel facilitating practices that depend on publicizing one's
price or output. As a result, the way information is communicated has been
a factor in merger analysis, particularly when the fear is that the merger
might facilitate collusion.2 Another recent example is the Libor litigation,
including allegations that banks used misreporting about interest rates as a
device for manipulating them.3 In the U.S.A. the courts have confronted
complaints that exchanges of wage and salary information was in fact
devices for collusive suppression of wages below the competitive level. 4
Such claims have arisen in numerous industries, ranging from petroleum
geologists, to law professors, and more recently to high tech. silicon valley
employees.5
In the 1980s and earlier "information" meant mainly the print media,
radio, television, film, and analog recording. All were involved in antitrust
disputes at one time or another, and the nature of the challenged practices
ran the entire gamut of United States antitrust law -- from vertical
*

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Profess, Law and History, University of Iowa. A version of this
paper was presented at the conference on Antitrust & Information, Bocconi University and
Salento University, Milan, Italy, June 20, 2014. Thank you to Professor Mariateresa Maggiolino
for the invitation.
1
E.g., William H. Page, Communication and Concerted Action, 38 LOY.U.CHI.L.J. 405 (2007);
William H. Page, The Gary Dinners and the Meaning of Concerted Action, 62 SMU L.REV. 597
(2009).
2
See 4 & 4A PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶914, 942-944 (3d
ed. 2009) & 2014 Supplement.
3
E.g., In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, 935 F.Supp.2d 666
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
4
In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litig., , 856 F.Supp.2d 1103 (N.D.Cal. 2012).
5
E.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001).
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integration and exclusion in the 1948 Paramount case,6 to refusal to deal in
Lorain Journal,7 a series of newspaper mergers and the passage of the
Newspaper Preservation Act in 1970 to protect newspaper production joint
ventures.8 There was also the Times-Picayune decision, in which the
Supreme Court refused to condemn a government-challenged tying
arrangement in the newspaper publishing industry, exonerating the practice
of a New Orleans' newspaper of requiring that the same classified
advertisements be run in its morning and evening editions.9 And there was
the Broadcast Music Case (1979), which rejected an antitrust challenge
and in the process recognized the value of blanket copyright licenses for
recorded music.10
Information also has an important role to play in competition policy in
the regulated industries, mainly because agencies depend on accurate
information that is most typically supplied by the regulated firms. As a
result, misreporting of one's own market position can serve to exclude a
rival, or itself become a device for collusion. Or, in patent law, exaggerated
threats about the validity or strength of one's own patents can become a
potent exclusion device.11
All of these issues concerning the relationship between competition
policy and information remain very much with us today. Many are more
important than ever, given the ubiquity of information and the speed at
which it travels.
I want to spend a few minutes on a different path, however: the
relationship between information technologies and competition policy.
Technological change can both induce and undermine the use of
information to facilitate anticompetitive practices. This change is partly a
result of digitization and the many products and processes that it enables.
The technologies of information account for a significant portion of the
difficulties that competition law encounters when its addresses intellectual
property rights. In addition, changes in the technologies of information
6

United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
8
E.g., Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C.Cir.
1989); 15 U.S.C. § 1802.
9
Times-Piayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
10
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
11
E.g., Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
7
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affect the structures of certain products, in the process either increasing or
decreasing the potential for competitive harm.
Power Assessments
That brings me to my first topic, which is market power assessments
in markets for information technologies. An important consequence of
digital technologies is to change the size or shape of the markets in which
firms operate, although to some extent mail order sellers such as Amazon
had already begun this even with standard product shipping. eBooks
compete everywhere that electronic transmission is available. Indeed, both
the production and distribution of digital books or other media is so different
from the traditional structures of these markets that most historical
analogies fail us. In the process, digital technologies change our ideas
about assessment of power.
One problem is that the high ratio of fixed to variable costs entails
that prices must be considerably above short run marginal cost in order to
be profitable. However, our shorter run measures of market power, such
as those based on the Lerner Index, express power as a relationship
between prices and short run costs. As a result, firms with high fixed costs
tend to appear as if they have significant market power. A portion of the
excess of price over marginal cost may reflect the profits of oligopoly, while
another portion may reflect fixed costs, including R&D investment, that
does not show up in short-run marginal costs. No inference of monopoly in
the antitrust sense can be drawn unless returns over a fairly long run are
excessive. Often such products are sold in moderately competitive product
differentiated markets. For example, the market for an electronic "app" for
a device such as an iPad show competition between dozens of calculators,
notepads, or games. These markets are simultaneously competitive but
may also exhibit high price-cost margins if only the short run is
considered.12
At the same time, the inability to earn high returns over the long run is
not a sine qua non of antitrust market power either. For example, a
combination of high fixed costs plus low variable costs, as in our "app"
example, creates inducement for market division or price fixing, either of
12

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133 (2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2028314
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which could serve to reduce market wide output and increase the prices of
the product in question. That proposition is inconsistent with absence of
market power. If a cartel of firms lacking any power attempted to raise
price (such as a group of 10 tomato growers in a market of 10,000) they
would simply lose all their sales. This is manifestly not true of a group of
app makers, provided that their collective output defines a market.
While high fixed costs might serve to explain why a cartel occurs,
they certainly do not justify it. One reason is that when firms collude they
can be expected to charge the monopoly price, not the minimum price
necessary to get returns up to the competitive level. Another is that
product differentiation is typically sufficient to produce above cost returns
even when fixed costs are high. The real concern is markets with high
fixed costs whose output cannot be differentiated.
In its recent Actavis decision the United States Supreme Court held
that market power could be inferred from a large "pay for delay" settlement
from a branded drug maker to a generic. Under that agreement the generic
firm would stay out of the market for a specified term in exchange for the
pioneer's payment, often in the hundreds of millions of dollars.13 That
holding has been criticized for inferring market power from the existence of
a patent, but that is hardly the case. The high pay-for-delay settlement
indicates power because it shows that the payor has volume and margins
that are worth protecting. To be sure, the payor's output may reflect the
power of a valid patent, but one should not confuse the legitimacy question
with the power question. Further, even if a patent is perfectly valid, a
horizontal price fixing or market division agreement is not justified, because
it tends to equate the value of the patent with the full monopoly or cartel
value of the market.14
These facts serve mainly as a warning that the question of market
power and intellectual property rights, or market power and high fixed
costs, must be answered circumspectly. The answers may differ
depending on the question being asked. For example, suppose that there
are twenty note taking "apps" available for the Ipad or other Apple device.
13

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013).
See 2B PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶520 (4th ed. 2014) &
2014 Supplement; Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme
Court's Actavis Decision, 15 Minn. J. L., Sci. & Tech. 3 (2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2286255.
14
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Each one of these, assuming it is not free, sells at a price considerably
above short run marginal cost. This latter fact, standing alone, should not
serve to establish a monopoly power requirement for an exclusionary
practice, at least not without a careful assessment of exactly how the
defendant app manufacturer's practice will result in market wide (as
opposed to individual) exclusion, as well as the likelihood that such
exclusion will occur. At the same time, however, we need not hesitate to
condemn price fixing or naked market division among these same
manufacturers, even when high price-cost margins explain their motive.
Digital Technologies and Consumer Choice: Google Search
The other side of the market power coin is consumer choice. One
consequence of the simultaneous revolutions in telecommunications and
digital technology is that consumers have never faced a wider array of
choices, and the costs of switching among alternative products have never
been lower.15
Here an important factor is the degree of dependence between
dedicated hardware and compatible digital choices. While purely digital
systems are or can be made to be highly portable, hardware is often much
less so. As an example, consider the differences between the
Microsoft/Windows cases of more than a decade ago16 the Google search
case in both the USA and Europe today. Microsoft was able to exploit a
high degree of dedication between computer hardware – so called “IBMcompatible” computer stations -- and the Windows operating systems. For
example, a business that operated 300 Windows computers could switch to
the Apple operating system only by switching out its computers. This
would be extraordinarily costly, not only for the computers themselves but
15

For discussions from different perspectives, see Adam Candeub, Behavioral Economics,
Internet Search, and Antitrust, 9 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 407 (2014); Aaron S. Edlin &
Robert G. Harris, The Role of Switching Costs in Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison of Microsoft
and Google, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 169 (2013). On switching costs in high tech markets
generally, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Movement of Technology, 19 GMU L.Rev.
1119 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990559 (2012);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1679849.
16

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir. 2001).
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also for the training of employees, the replacement of a great deal of
application software, and so on.
The Google Search cases presents a very sharp contrast, and for
that reason I remain quite skeptical about the U.S. and EU investigations
into Google Search, notwithstanding Google’s high market share in Europe.
Most search engines are multi-plaltform products that run equally well on
Windows, Apple, and Android devices. To be sure, Google may be the
default, or preinstalled search engine on android mobile phones as well as
some others, but it is only the default and consumers are generally able to
install alternative search engines. Microsoft makes its own search engine,
Bing, the default on search engines accompanying Microsoft operating
systems. The story for desktop and laptop computers is even simpler from
the consumers’ perspective. Any of the more popular search engines, of
which there are many, can be installed almost instantaneously and at no
charge. Not uncommonly, computer users have several search engines
preinstalled and any time they are unhappy with the results of one engine’s
search they can turn to another one.
Here, it is important not to confuse high market share with monopoly.
The latter requires the ability to hold prices above the competitive level or
provide an inferior service even while retaining one’s own dominant market
share. As a result competition policy makers should be wary of
technological locks that make it difficult for consumers to switch to a
different search engine. Having done that, the concern about the content
of a particular search becomes far less important. To be sure, deception is
a problem, but that lies in the area of consumer protection rather than
antitrust . I am much less concerned about a Google search result that
favors its own asset -- such as YouTube, a Google subsidiary -- in a search
for videos if I know that the operator has alternative search engines that are
accessible with relative ease.
This suggests to me that the competition law authorities should pay
less attention to the content of Google search results, but instead focus on
ensuring that every platform from which search engines are launched,
including mobile platforms, have adequate alternatives available to which
reasonably well informed customers can easily switch.
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Digitization, Cost Structure, and Collusion:
the eBooks Case
The name “eBooks” is heavily associated with a collusion case born
in the United States, but which later expanded to Europe and elsewhere.
Apple facilitated the creation of a cartel of book publishers that not only
increased the price of electronic books but also imposed pricing rules in the
form of most favored nation clauses on Apple’s competitor Amazon. At this
time that case is on appeal.17
The technology of ebooks is currently transforming the book market,
with implications that go far beyond that particular price fixing agreement.
Most significantly, ebooks are rapidly changing the cost structure of the
industry from one that had a nontrivial fixed cost component and relatively
high variable costs to one in which nearly all the costs other than royalties
and dealer markups are fixed.
For traditional publishing fixed costs generally refer to the costs of
manuscript acquisitions, editorial staff, typesetting and at least some
marketing. Variable costs include paper and other stock, printing, cutting,
binding, inventory, shipping, and of course retailer carrying costs.18 The
publishing market was never particularly problematic for antitrust enforcers.
The market contained numerous small publishers and only rarely had a
dominant firm. The sheer number of sellers as well as the extent of product
differentiation served to limit the opportunities for collusion. There has
been a considerable history of resale price maintenance in the book
publishing industry. In the United States it actually dates back to 1908,
before the antitrust laws were even applied to resale price maintenance. In
the Bobbs-Merrill decision of that year the Supreme Court refused to
enforce a price maintenance clause in a copyright license agreement.19
However, the vehicle was not competition policy but rather copyright law's
"first-sale" doctrine. The British "Net Book Agreement," which largely

17

In re Electronic Books Antitrust Litig., 859 F.Supp.2d 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
For data, see http://www.gorhamprinting.com/prices-book-printing/price-charts.html.
19
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (The Straus family were German immigrants
and founders of Macys Department Stores. Isador and his wife Ida, a co-owner, both perished on
the Titanic in 1912). See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION
WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, ch. 13 (N.Y.: Oxford,
2012)
18
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prevented discounting of books lower than the publisher's announced price,
was another example.20
The eBook has drastically changed the cost structure of the book
publishing market. Acquisition, editing costs and royalties are still variable,
but editing has become less expensive in the age of computers. Once a
book has been typeset into an electronic file most fixed costs except for
advertising and promotion are spent. Further, while advertising might be
considered a variable cost for some purposes, it is not a cost that is
attached to each individual unit sold. Inventory does not need to be
maintained, other than the obligation to keep a copy of the digital file. A
virtually infinite number of copies can be made, all at the trivial cost of
electronic transmission.
This change in cost structure is having remarkable effects on the
book market, many of which are not yet realized. First, it increases the
incentive to collude, as is the case in many industries with high fixed costs.
Competition tends to drive prices to variable, or marginal, cost without
enough remaining to cover fixed costs. Offsetting this in the book industry
is product differentiation: each title is unique, very likely giving publishers at
least some pricing discretion.
Unquestionably the dramatic rise of the ebook has cut enormously
into the sales of traditional brick-and-mortar bookstores, as well as national
distribution of physical hard- and soft- copy books. Eventually it may even
threaten the existence of any book retailer who is independent of the
publisher, including giants such as Apple and Amazon.com. While Apple's
30% markup has been widely noted, actual markups vary from something
less than that amount, to more than 100% for independently published
books. These markups seem to be high in relation to services rendered.
eBooks do not need to be inventoried and there is little concern about
returns or losses. As a result, risk is minimal. Most of the relevant
publication and promotional information is in electronic form and is supplied
by the publisher in any event. To be sure the major retailers offer a format
for reading the book file, but the format market is highly competitive and
better ones are being introduced all the time. Many of the larger
20

See British Office of Fair Trading, "An evaluation of the impact upon productivity of ending
resale price maintenance on books" (2008), available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/oft981.pdf.
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commercial publishers, such as Penguin Random House, Hachette
(currentl in controversy with Amazon), Harper Collins, Simon & Schuster,
Macmillan, Harlequin, and also the quasi-commercial university presses,
such as Oxford, Harvard, and Cambridge produce ebooks in a wide variety
of formats. Others, such as Penn Press, tend to favor direct distribution
intended for more generic readers, such as Adobe Digital Editions or
Bluefire Reader.
We may well see the day when the dealer intermediary in the book
market becomes superfluous. In order to survive intermediaries such as
Amazon or Apple will have to be able to take advantage of either
economies of scale in distribution services or technology ties with their
devices. There is no good technological or business reason that ebooks
cannot be distributed directly by the publishers to an internet site, or
perhaps by consortia of publishers. Indeed, we may see the emergence of
a system roughly equivalent to the “blanket license” that governs the
distribution of recorded music over radio stations or other media. That is,
authors' books would be digitized and then placed by nonexclusive license
into a massive database accessed by a website. Readers could then pay
for and download individual titles, which they could then preserve
themselves or else have maintained for them on a cloud service operated
by the website. The transaction costs of monitoring such a system would
be very low.
To be sure, traditional book sellers often supplied point-of-sale
information as well as the books themselves. For example, a well informed
employee in a high quality bookshop could be a treasure trove of
information. But that particular informational service has been greatly
eclipsed by a proliferation of online sources, including both professional
and readers' book reviews.
Today we continue to face a variety of file formats for ebook files and
readers. The history of most technologies is that for an initial period there
will be a great deal of incompatability as each seller attempts to market its
own preferred format or distribution system. In the early days of the
automobile cars burned many types of fuels; and in the early days of
videotapes we had Sony Betamax and VHS, and later in DVDs we had BluRay and HD DVD. But these multiple standards are inefficient and as the
industry matures unification is virtually inevitable. That will very likely
happen in the ebook market as well, as publishers coalesce around a
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single standard. The internet and device market will develop readers that
will cover the new standard and enable consumers to maintain an
electronic library. Whether firms like Amazon or Apple will be able to hold
out by offering unique features is difficult to say, but one might predict that
theirs will be a losing battle. In particular, why should a large publishing
house continued to pay Amazon a significant commission when it can selfdistribute at little to no higher cost?
Net Neutrality
Internet neutrality, or so-called "net neutrality," is fundamentally a
problem in vertical integration and pricing. In the United States it might be
or become an antitrust law problem, but in general it is not. EU law sweeps
more broadly and the European Parliament has recently imposed
significant limitations on the power of providers to discriminate between
types of offerings.21
In any event, the term "neutrality" is hardly self defining. For some
people "neutrality" means charging everyone the same periodic price, such
as 40 € per month, no matter how much they use. For others, neutrality
means charging people in proportion to their use, asking higher volume
users to pay more. Some look at whether different customers or content
providers are obtaining different speed, or throughput levels. Some look at
whether, certain providers are being excluded altogether, for either
economic or noneconomic reasons. The questions are all complicated by
the fact that internet access is a two sided market, in which providers
obtain revenues from both consumers and providers.
Under United States antitrust law net neutrality issues can become an
antitrust problem when a vertically integrated firm excludes programming
that competes with its own assets. For example, Comcast Cable company,
an internet service provider, also owns NBC, a large distributor of
programming, including movies. If Comcast were to place limits on Netflix,
a major streamer of movies and television programming, in order to reduce
competition with NBC, that could certainly be an antitrust violation. Such
issues are customarily dealt with preemptively under the law of vertical
mergers; or as exclusive contracting or refusal to deal if no merger is under
consideration. Here, however, our law of unilateral refusal to deal is so
21

Recent activity is summarized at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/eu-actions.

Hovenkamp

COMPETITION POLICY AND INFORMATION

June, 2014, Page 11

narrow that the problem would very likely have to be dealt with under
communications law.
Pricing is a different matter, and would not frequently present an
antitrust problem. First of all, per unit pricing is actually the norm in roughly
similar technologies, including telephony, electricity, natural gas, and the
like. Second, price discrimination that is unrelated to exclusion of a
competitor is presumptively efficient.
The consumer choice issue also looms increasingly large on
competition policy concerning older technologies – most notably cable
television. Of most recent note in the United States is the [proposed]
merger between Comcast Cable and Time-Warner cable, and more
recently, of AT&T and DirecTV, a satellite provider. These mergers involve
both old technology cable companies and relatively new technology
internet service providers (ISPs). Traditional hard wired cable television
delivered with scheduled programs into users' homes is in fact a
technological dinosaur – increasingly abandoned by the younger
generation, although it retains a strong position among older people and
technologically challenged younger people.
One potential concern about the Comcast merger is restraints on
innovation – i.e., the idea that the companies will limit the migration of
consumers from traditional cable to internet programming. The rationale is
not difficult to discern: the internet is, or can be made to be, both more
effiicient and more competitive. The fear, expressed in Netflix’s opposition
to the merger, is that cable television companies will either cap internet
bandwidth or price it out in a way that makes Netflix more costly.
The issue is complicated. On the one hand, the cable companies
may not obtain as much revenue from internet data streaming as they do
from carrying programs themselves. On the other side, consumers
typically pay an extra fee for their internet access, and sometimes this fee
is quite large in relation to the bandwidth that they obtain.
In the United States the cable companies have been laggards in the
move toward greater internet bandwidths. Google and AT&T are now both
installing ultra high spend internet in many communities. However, this
internet is typically not tied to a cable television company at all, although it
may be bundled with satellite television.
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The game is also a precarious one for the cable companies, because
the movement away from traditional cable is well underway and the range
and robustness of alternatives is growing larger by the day. One impact of
a significant limitation on Netflix or similar program streamer is that the
viewer will simply drop cable altogether and make a different deal for
internet service provision.
In my mind, the best solution to this problem is to permit these
mergers, but with significant conditions on the post-merger firm’s ability to
limit internet streaming. The companies should be able to charge more for
greater volumes or faster throughput of data, but these differentials should
be reasonable and also nondiscriminatory as between internally owned and
external programming. That will both facilitate the movement to the new
technology and force this cable company to think about how to shift its
revenue in the new environment.
The Patent Problem in Information Technologies
Finally, a very brief word on information technologies and the patent
system. Today there is a great deal of news to the effect that the patent
system is not working, that far too many patents are issued, and that
discerning their validity and scope is extremely costly and produces
uncertain results. There is also a great deal of talk about standard setting,
FRAND royalty obligations, the right to an injunction on FRANDencumbered patents, software and business method patents, and the
like.22
Without analyzing these issues in any detail, let me observe only that
they very largely, although not exclusively, concern information
technologies -- that is technologies relating to the creation, formatting,
dissemination, and consumption of digital information.23 The main reason
is the crucial importance of networking in information technologies, which
22

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition in Information Technologies: Standards-Essential
Patents, Non-Practicing Entities, and FRAND Bidding, INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW &
POLICY 439 (2013) Competition Law Institute, Fordham Univ. School of Law), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154203.
23
See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Chs. 4-5, 9 (New York: Oxford, 2012).
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demands interoperability, and thus technological compatibility, between the
devices and programs of different competitors.
In the United States, where we are more concerned about seeing
antitrust confined to a fairly restricted domain, most of these problems are
viewed as presenting issues of patent law, not of antitrust law. Indeed,
most of the big decisions, such as eBay, which rejected the rule of virtually
automatic injunctions against patent infringers, and the recent round of
FRAND cases, are not antitrust cases at all. I think we would be well
served to relax those boundary requirements, and that the Supreme
Court's Actavis decision of about one year ago is a step in the right
direction. That decision makes clear that questions about patent validity
and scope do not rule every decision about competition policy. Some
practices involving perfectly valid patents can be anticompetitive.
Indeed, here competition law has the comparative advantage. We
competition lawyers and academics have been studying the effects of
industry practices on output and competitiveness for decades. By contrast,
we have very little useful information about how patent duration, scope or
enforcement affect welfare in the long run. In that state of affairs it is hardly
clear that competition policy should be yielding much territory to patent
policy.24

24

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Institutional Advantage in Competition and Innovation Policy, 2013
CONCURRENCES 27 (2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2307141

